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Abstract 
Smart contracts are coded parameters written into an immutable distributed ledger 
called a blockchain. There has been increasing legal interest in the application of these 
self-executing programs to conduct transactions. Most of the scholarly and practical 
analysis so far has been taken the claims of this technology being akin to a contract at face 
value, with legal analysis of contract formation, performance, and enforcement at the 
forefront of the debate. This article discusses that while smart contracts may pose some 
interesting legal questions, most of these are irrelevant, and smart contracts should be 
understood almost strictly from a technical perspective, and that any legal response is 
entirely dependent on the technical capabilities of the smart contract. The article 
proposes that smart contracts are not contracts for all practical purposes. 
1. Introduction 
During the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia, viewers in various countries were treated to 
a series of adverts during the half time break describing a fictional future powered by the 
“blockchain solution”. The commercial1 depicts a family home were all the appliances and 
devices “come alive” after the inhabitants leave the house, and these devices talk amongst 
each other about spending an exact amount of energy to complete their functions, and 
this amount is paid directly to the utility service provider through automated 
transactions.  
This future envisions a network of connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices that are 
constantly performing transactions through smart contracts. These are coded 
parameters written into an immutable distributed ledger called a blockchain.2 The idea 
behind smart contracts is to have seamless machine-to-machine (M2M) transactions that 
will remove the need for human interaction, or could be entered by humans to 
automatically enforce existing obligations. A smart contract advocate explains a potential 
future use:  
“I could agree to a smart contract with a local library stating that if I do 
not return a book by a certain date (and the library scans a book as it is 
returned), the cost of the book will automatically be sent from my Bitcoin 
wallet to the library. In contrast, under a traditional contract, the library 
would send me a bill, which I could choose to not pay—in violation of the 
                                                      
* Senior Lecturer in Intellectual Property Law at the University of Sussex.  
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBYwWiGa2Do. 
2 For more about the blockchain, see: Guadamuz A and Marsden C, ‘Blockchains and Bitcoin: Regulatory 
responses to cryptocurrencies’ (2015) 20 First Monday http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v20i12.6198.  
contract. In the extreme case, the library would resort to legal means to 
force me to pay.”3  
The future is already becoming a reality. In 2016 a couple translated their pre-nuptial 
agreement into an executable smart contract and uploaded it to the blockchain for it to 
be enforced automatically.4 Thousands of people around the globe are using an 
implementation of smart contracts to play an online game called Cryptokitties.5 French 
insurance company AXA is testing an automated flight compensation app that uses smart 
contracts.6 There are proposals to include smart contracts in everything from taxes7 to 
real estate.8 
There has already been some interest from legal scholars and practitioners about the 
implications of smart contracts, particularly about their validity under existing contract 
law. While the existing literature has been doing an excellent job of tackling a few 
questions about cryptographic agreements, there appears to be a gap in the way we are 
looking at the phenomenon. This is because the majority of existing legal literature on the 
subject has been dealing with smart contracts at face value, namely treating them from a 
strictly contractual analysis, and therefore dealing with contractual issues such as 
validity and enforceability. While smart contracts may pose some interesting legal 
questions, it will be the contention of this article that most of these are irrelevant, at least 
from a contract law perspective, and smart contracts should be understood strictly from 
a technical perspective, and that any legal response is entirely dependent on the technical 
capabilities of the smart contract. While there could be legal issues, these are not as 
evident as one could envisage.  
The article is divided in two parts. The first will describe the history, definition, and uses 
of smart contracts. While the phenomenon is starting to become more widespread and 
such a descriptive exercise may appear superfluous, there is considerable disparity in the 
understanding and application of the underlying technical solutions, and this results in 
often competing and contradictory definitions used. Blockchain technology in general, 
and smart contracts specifically, have been the subject of grandiose claims and 
considerable hype in recent years, so a meticulous look at the definitions and background 
is warranted, and this will hopefully prove useful even for those who are very familiar 
with the technology.  
The second part of the article will try to look at smart contracts from a critical 
perspective. Having explored the definitions, it will be the objective of this article to make 
clear that thinking of smart contracts using traditional legal analysis is not only 
misguided, it may not be even possible. The very unique characteristic of the blockchain 
technology that supports many of these types of agreements make some legal questions 
                                                      
3 Gulker M, ‘Are Smart Contracts the Future of Fraud Prevention?’ (2017) American Institute for Economic 
Research https://www.aier.org/article/are-smart-contracts-future-fraud-prevention.   
4 Del Castillo M, ‘Prenup Built in Ethereum Smart Contract Rethinks Marriage Obligations’ (2016) Coindesk 
https://www.coindesk.com/prenup-ethereum-marriage-obligations/.  
5 https://www.cryptokitties.co/.   
6 https://fizzy.axa/en-gb/. 
7 Rikken O, ‘Blockchain Real Time Tax’ (2017) LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/blockchain-real-
time-tax-olivier-rikken/.   
8 https://propy.com/.   
irrelevant, as the contracts are often in the hands of actors that may be immune to legal 
scrutiny and enforcement. In the end, smart contracts are by nature designed to disrupt 
the legal profession, and also intend to bypass regulatory and judicial oversight, and if 
they work as intended, questions such as validity, contract formation, breach, error and 
even fraud may be moot. The article ends with the claim that for all practical purposes 
smart contracts are not contracts, and should mostly be considered as self-executing 
programs designed to automate operations between users.  
2. Introducing smart contracts  
2.1 Background 
Can computers contract with one another? Can legal norms be transposed into computer 
code? The answer to these questions has been the subject of legal scrutiny for decades. 
The clue of the answer to the first question lies not only on issues of agency, legitimacy 
and contract formation, but the key is on the second question. The issue of translating 
norms into code, and the analysis of legal systems and autonomous artificial agents has 
been a well-discussed area of legal scholarship.9 It is not the place of this paper to discuss 
this area in detail, but suffice it to say that through theoretical and practical research, it 
has been recognised that it would be possible to codify some legal expressions into 
machine-readable format.10  
It is also important to point out that exaggerated claims about the capabilities of artificial 
intelligence and expert systems are also not new, and at some point, it was proposed that 
legal practitioners and judges would be using “law machines” to give advice and make 
decisions in areas they were unfamiliar with.11 
Smart contracts can therefore be seen as a subset of the discussion on artificial 
intelligence and the law. At the very basic level, when we talk about smart contracts, we 
are dealing with the concept of autonomous systems designed to conduct transactions 
without human intervention, and even the humble vending machine could fall under the 
category of smart contracts.12 With increases in computing power, it became clear that it 
would be economically advantageous to program computers to interface with one 
another in ways that traditionally would require two people to agree with. Some of these 
automated transactions could be contractual in nature.  
The early discussion of autonomous contracts consisted of a framework for electronic 
contractual interaction with autonomous agents that would negotiate with each other 
                                                      
9 Some works include Bing J and Harvold T, Legal Decisions and Information Systems (Universitetsforlaget; 
Henley on Thames 1977); Sartor G, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Legal Philosophy and Legal Theory (Tano 
1993); Leith P, Formalism in Al and Computer Science (Ellis Horwood 1990); and Bourcier D, Bochereau L 
and Bourgine P, “Extracting legal knowledge by means of multilayer neural network. Application to 
municipal jurisprudence", in Proceedings of the 3rd ICAIL, Oxford (ACM 1991), 288.  
10 A good survey of early artificial intelligence law research can be found here: Rissland EL, ‘Artificial 
intelligence and law: Stepping stones to a model of legal reasoning’ (1990) 99:8 Yale Law Journal 1957-
1981. See also: Governatori G and others, ‘On Legal Contracts, Imperative and Declarative Smart Contracts, 
and Blockchain Systems’ (2018) 26 Artificial Intelligence and Law 377.  
11 Susskind RE, ‘Expert systems in law: A jurisprudential approach to artificial intelligence and legal 
reasoning’ (1986) 49:2 Modern Law Review 168-194.  
12 Szabo N, The Idea of Smart Contracts (1997) https://bit.ly/2vh88ji.  
based on pre-established parameters.13 Theoretically, it was recognised at some point 
that electronic autonomous agents could conduct themselves as legal agents acquiring, 
and even violating norms.14 The idea of self-executing contracts requires not only the 
writing of those norms into code, but also allowed some manner of autonomy in which 
an agent could follow orders, but also generate new obligations independently.15  
A sophisticated corpus of research developed,16 and this work was eventually translated 
into both practical application and legal recognition. The first step towards the later was 
the acceptance that contracts could be conducted electronically, it may be difficult to 
imagine nowadays, but at some point there had to be an evolution in the law to allow such 
agreements.17 The main legislative recognition came in the Electronic Commerce 
Directive,18 where Article 9 prompted member states to allow for the recognition of 
contracts conducted electronically, and to eliminate formalities that would interfere with 
these formats. Furthermore, case law in various jurisdictions started to recognise a 
variety of formats in the conclusion of electronic contracts.19 Then followed increasing 
doctrinal recognition that there was considerable legal basis for contract formation and 
performance by autonomous agents.20   
The main practical uses for autonomous agents were in the shape of Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) agreements,21 which were a set of protocols designed to allow 
autonomous agents to transact with one another digitally by placing orders in business 
supply-chains. These agreements included complex terms: 
“The ordering, delivery, and payment for such supplies means that there 
are contractual terms surrounding the transaction-the time of delivery, 
what to do if the supplies do not arrive in time or are defective, what to do 
                                                      
13 Sallé M, ‘Electronic contract framework for contractual agents’, in Conference of the Canadian Society for 
Computational Studies of Intelligence, (Springer 2002) 349-353.  
14 Conte R, Falcone R and Sartor G, ‘Introduction: Agents and Norms: How to fill the gap?’ 7:1Artificial 
Intelligence and Law 1-15 (1999).  
15 Boella G, and van der Torre L, ‘Contracts as legal institutions in organizations of autonomous agents’ in  
Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IEEE 
Computer Society 2004) 948-955; and F Dignum, ‘Autonomous agents with norms (1999) 7:1 Artificial 
Intelligence and Law 69-79. 
16 See: Dignum V, Meyer J, and Weigand H, ‘Towards an organizational model for agent societies using 
contracts’, in Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent 
systems: part 2 (ACM 2002) 694-695.  
17 For more on this subject, see: MacQueen HL, ‘Software Transactions and Contract Law’, in Edwards L and 
Waelde C (eds), Law and the Internet: Regulating Cyberspace (Hart Publishing 1997); Kidd DL and 
Daugherty WH, ‘Adapting Contract Law to Electronic Contracts: Overview and Suggestions’ (2000) 26 
Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal 215. 
18 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000]  
OJ L 178/1.   
19 For example: contracts could be conducted by fax in Merrick Homes Ltd v Duff 1996 SC 497, just to give 
one example.  
20 Most notable, the elegant use of Roman Law to describe autonomous agents here: Weitzenböck EM, ‘Good 
faith and fair dealing in contracts formed and performed by electronic agents’ (2004) 12 Artificial 
Intelligence and Law 83.  
21 Radin MJ, ‘Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment’ (2000) 75 Indiana Law Journal 38.  
if the payment is late, and all the other transactional parameters that 
people contract about. All of this can in principle be handled primarily by 
machine, using computer programs that "negotiate" with each other and 
enter into "agreements" with each other.”22 
This description of the functions performed by earlier electronic contracts is interesting 
because in many ways it resembles some of the functions that have been hyped as new 
and novel by smart contracts. What is different then?  
Using the most basic definition, a smart contract is “an agreement whose execution is 
automated” which is “effected through a computer running code that has translated legal 
prose into an executable program”.23 This definition makes it no different than an EDI 
agreement, or other early variations of machine-implemented contracts. The modern 
implementation has the main difference that it involves dynamic cryptographic elements. 
While earlier electronic agreements used cryptography in the shape of digital signatures 
and other authentication mechanisms, the term “smart contract” was initially coined to 
differentiate them from EDI agreements, which were considered static, while the ‘smart’ 
variety would be dynamic and proactive by the incorporation of more sophisticated 
protocols.24  
However, those traditional definitions have been superseded by the addition of other 
elements, particularly dynamic cryptographic elements allowing for secure and tamper-
proof transactions, what some call “smart contract code”25 or even “strong smart 
contracts”.26 This article will continue to use the term smart contracts to mean the more 
recent variation that uses cryptography, namely these strong smart contracts.  
At the most basic form, a smart contract is an “if-then” statement that runs on the 
blockchain where “parties can enter into a binding commercial relationship, either entirely 
or partially memorialized using code, and use software to manage contractual 
performance."27  
There have not been many attempts to define smart contracts in the law,28 but there have 
been a few efforts to recognise the validity of smart contracts.29  The first US state to 
legislate on the subject was Arizona, which defines smart contracts as follows:  
                                                      
22 Ibid, p.1131.  
23 Raskin M, ‘Law and Legality of Smart Contracts’ (2017) 1 Georgia Law Technology Review 305, p.309.  
24 Szabo N, ‘Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks’ (1997) 2 First Monday 
https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v2i9.548. 
25 Stark J, ‘Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts’ (2016) Coindesk 
https://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts/. 
26 Raskin, supra note 23 at 310.  
27 De Filippi P and Wright A, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code (Harvard University Press 2018), 
p.74.  
28 The European Parliament recently made a statement about blockchains and smart contracts, but it does 
not define the terms. See: European Parliament resolution of 3 October 2018 on distributed ledger 
technologies and blockchains: building trust with disintermediation (2017/2772(RSP)).  
29 A list of US state legislation dealing with blockchains and smart contracts can be found here: 
https://bit.ly/2L4Oksc.  
"Smart contract" means an event-driven program, with state, that runs on 
a distributed, decentralized, shared and replicated ledger and that can 
take custody over and instruct transfer of assets on that ledger."30 
The intention of the law is to specifically recognise the use of smart contracts defined in 
this manner in the conclusion of contracts, but also allows their use in commerce. Art 5(c) 
reads: 
“Smart contracts may exist in commerce. A contract relating to a 
transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely 
because that contract contains a smart contract term.”31 
It is interesting that this same language, or similar variations, can be found in a few other 
legislative texts.32 For example, the New York legislature has passed a definition of smart 
contracts that is exactly the same as the one from Arizona.33 It would appear that in the 
rush to regulate on this subject, legislators across the United States in particular have 
been using the same legal definition. It must be pointed out that at the time of writing no 
other country has attempted to legislate on smart contracts, so the existing legal 
definition is the one presented above.  
As the Arizona law is being used as a template for others, this definition requires some 
unpacking, as it lacks some clarity, but also it is rather restrictive, and could be leaving 
out several types of smart contracts. The definition contains three main elements:  
a) A smart contract means an event-driven program, with state.  
This means that a smart contract must be a computer program that follows a series of 
events and that it is designed to remember preceding instructions or user interactions 
(stateful). This means that these documents start as lines of computer code written in a 
language capable of making “IF-THIS-THEN-THAT” statements that can express legal 
concepts, but they also can identify more complex norms. The contract has to be 
deterministic in the sense that the same input will always produce the same result, and 
the contract should also contain all eventualities arising from the contract expressed in 
code.34 Any computer language can be used to code a contract,35 but there are languages 
that are being designed specifically for smart contracts,36 and a particular requirement 
favoured by many developers is that the language should be Turing complete, that is, that 
every computing problem can be solved exactly or approximately by using the same 
                                                      
30 Arizona House Bill 2417 (2017).  
31 Ibid.  
32 See for example Nebraska LB695, and Ohio SB300.  
33 New York A08780.  
34 Christidis K and Devetsikiotis M, ‘Blockchains and Smart Contracts for the Internet of Things’ (2016) 4 
IEEE Access 2292.  
35 There is extensive literature on ontological approaches to translate legal concept into code, for example: 
Sartor G and others, ‘Computable Models of the Law and ICT: State of the Art and Trends in European 
Research’ in Pompeu Casanovas and others (eds), Computable Models of the Law (Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg 2008); and Han ZZ and others, ‘Interoperability from Electronic Commerce to Litigation Using 
XML Rules’ (2007) 15 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 233.  
36 Kim HM and Laskowski M, ‘Toward an Ontology-Driven Blockchain Design for Supply-Chain Provenance’ 
(2018) 25 Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management 18.  
language.37 At the time of writing, the most popular language is Solidity,38 with other 
bespoke languages such as Michelson, Ivy, Hoon, and Rust in existence. Other projects 
favour mainstream languages such as C++ and Javascript.  
b) The program runs on a distributed, decentralized, shared and replicated ledger.  
This means that the smart contract is written and runs on a blockchain. While deceivingly 
simple, this part of the definition is the one that requires a more thorough explanation. 
Countless pages have been written on the blockchain,39 but for something that is so 
hyped, there is little consensus on what a blockchain actually is, and this confusion could 
have important legal effects. One of the most accepted definitions is that a blockchain is 
a public decentralised permissionless40 cryptographic database that operates as an open 
ledger of all of the transactions that have been recorded, and that this record is 
immutable41 and tamper-proof,42 so that it “can be inspected by every network 
participant”.43  
In more technical terms, the first definition was written in the Bitcoin white paper by 
Satoshi Nakamoto,44 which describes a cryptographic coin that is comprised of a chain of 
digital signatures that are added to a block and time-stamped and appended at the end of 
the chain; so all transactions are publicly available and verified, but also the system is 
tamper-free because to change a transaction you would also need to change all the 
transactions that came before the one you are trying to verify. These verifications are 
performed by people running the calculations, which is called ‘mining’. This system is 
what is known as proof of work. Proof of work protects the blockchain from attackers and 
spammers because it requires those participating to perform some work in the shape of 
computing time. In Bitcoin, the proof of work consists in calculating numbers until the 
correct solution is found and then a new block is added to the blockchain.  
This definition is widely accepted as the most authoritative one, but it comes with a few 
limitations.45 Proof of work means that considerable amount of computing power is 
needed to operate the system and allocate blocks to miners, which means that the more 
transactions there are, the slower the system becomes because of the need to conduct 
verifications. This also means that proof of work can be are extremely energy wasteful by 
design, as the difficulty of finding a solution increases over time. 
                                                      
37 See: Teller A, ‘Turing Completeness in the Language of Genetic Programming with Indexed Memory’, 
Proceedings of the First IEEE Conference on Evolutionary Computation. IEEE World Congress on 
Computational Intelligence (IEEE 1994).  
38 This is mostly based on general perception, it is difficult to gather statistics.  
39 For an excellent sceptical look, see: Gerard D, Attack of the 50 Foot Blockchain: Bitcoin, Blockchain, 
Ethereum & Smart Contracts (Self 2017).  
40 This means that anyone can maintain the database, and no authentication to do so is required, see: 
‘Blockchain and Voting’ (Benlog, 28 December 2017) https://benlog.com/2017/12/28/blockchain-and-
voting/. 
41 However, the immutable nature of blockchains is disputed, as it will be discussed later in the article.  
42 Narayanan A and others, Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction 
(Princeton University Press 2016), p.27.  
43 Christidis and Devetsikiotis, supra note 34.  
44 Nakamoto S, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2007), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.   
45 See Gerard, supra note 39.  
So other blockchain solutions have arisen to make transactions faster and to use less 
power, which further complicates the definition of what is a blockchain. One such 
solution is to use a system called a proof of stake46 blockchain, which chooses the 
allocation of the next block between those with a stake in the system without the need 
for large expenditure of resources. Similarly, there are private blockchains, where the 
transactions are not open to public scrutiny. Another type is a permissioned blockchain,47 
where you need permission to access and modify the data, as opposed to the standard 
defined above where anyone can have access and add to the blockchain; these tend to be 
also private as the ledger is actually not open nor transparent. 
The result of this confusion is a situation in which anything can be called a blockchain, 
even if it does not meet the traditional definition set out by Nakamoto.48 In fact, the 
legislation defining smart contracts also comes with a legal definition of what is a 
blockchain, and this takes a broad approach. The Arizona law (and others) read: 
“Blockchain technology" means distributed ledger technology that uses a 
distributed, decentralized, shared and replicated ledger, which may be 
public or private, permissioned or permissionless, or driven by tokenized 
crypto economics or tokenless. The data on the ledger is protected with 
cryptography, is immutable and auditable and provides an uncensored 
truth.”49 
This can include almost anything to be a blockchain, and does away with some of the 
specific requirements set out by Nakamoto. As it can be private and permissioned it is not 
an open ledger, and therefore it need not be distributed either.50 This means that a legal 
smart contract would just be a private program running in a private network, which 
seems to defeat the purpose of the technology.  
This legal definition of blockchain contains a couple of problematic statements. The first 
is that the blockchain contains data that is immutable; while this is accurate for the most 
part, there are various scenarios in which information could be changed provided a 
majority of miners decide to change the record.51 A more accurate description is that a 
                                                      
46 King S and Nadal S, Ppcoin: Peer-to-peer crypto-currency with proof-of-stake (2012), 
http://blockchainlab.com/pdf/peercoin-paper.pdf.   
47 Kadiyala A, ‘Nuances Between Permissionless and Permissioned Blockchains’ (Medium, 17 February 
2018), https://medium.com/@akadiyala/nuances-between-permissionless-and-permissioned-
blockchains-f5b566f5d483.  
48 Jeffries A, ‘“Blockchain” Is Meaningless’ (The Verge, 7 March 2018) 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/7/17091766/blockchain-bitcoin-ethereum-cryptocurrency-
meaning. 
49 Arizona House Bill 2417 (2017). 
50 In fact, there are so-called blockchains out there with only one user: Gerard D, ‘The World Food 
Programme’s much-publicised “blockchain” has one participant — i.e., it’s a database’ (2017) Attack of the 
50 Foot Blockchain Blog, https://davidgerard.co.uk/blockchain/2017/11/26/the-world-food-
programmes-much-publicised-blockchain-has-one-participant-i-e-its-a-database/.  
51 Eyal I and Sirer EG, ‘Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable’ (2018) 61 Communications of 
the ACM 95.  
blockchain is “inherently resistant to data modification”.52 Secondly, the idea that this is 
a ledger that is protected with cryptography is a given, but the requirement that it 
provides an immutable version of “uncensored truth” seems not only problematic, but 
highly controversial. The problem is that treating information contained on the 
blockchain as “immutable truth” is quite simply not correct, the distributed ledger only 
acts as a record of the data that was entered into it, and cannot be used as “uncensored 
truth”. It is true that some information could be authoritative, such as time stamps, or to 
make a permanent record of a transaction, but having a record of a transaction does not 
tell us anything about the veracity of the information recorded into the system.  
To complicate matters, the legal definition in legislation such as the Arizona law require 
that the smart contract must be run on the blockchain. While this is not specified, this 
very well means that we need a platform that can execute the contract, and this is usually 
tied to the blockchain where the contract is written. Anyone can create and run a 
blockchain,53 so in theory any computer can act as a platform for smart contracts, just in 
the same way that you could turn your computer into a web server. However, this is 
inefficient, and it is better to rely on existing infrastructure. There are various platforms 
available for writing smart contracts, some are designed specifically for that task, such as 
Ethereum,54 and others are using existing infrastructure such as the Bitcoin blockchain 
and cryptocurrency.55  
A relevant consideration when looking at platforms is whether it is centralised or 
decentralised, as well as the governance structure that it has. A platform are said to be 
decentralised if there is no central authority maintaining the infrastructure that runs the 
contracts, this is possible with the implementation of a decentralised autonomous 
organisation (DAO) that executes transactions and releases funds automatically, without 
the need of a central controlling body.56 The governance structure is the decision-making 
procedure for who has control over the platform’s code, who can make changes to it, and 
how the platform is operated. There are various degrees of centralisation in this stage, 
with some platforms presenting considerable centralisation at this level.   
c) The smart contract can take custody over and instruct transfer of assets on that ledger.  
The final element present in the legislative definition of smart contracts is that they can 
be used to transfer assets on the blockchain. This is perhaps where the definition leaves 
out many other useful functions for smart contracts. It may be better to think here of the 
management of assets as using tokens for various operations needed by the contract. A 
token is usually a part of the contract that does not fulfil an IF-THEN function, but it is 
instrumental to the operation of the code.57 In other words, a token is simply code that 
                                                      
52 Müller L et al, Conceptual Framework for Legal and Risk Assessment of Crypto Tokens, MME Report (2018), 
https://www.mme.ch/fileadmin/files/documents/180501_BCP_Framework_for_Assessment_of_Crypto_
Tokens_-_Block_2.pdf.  
53 Saurel S, ‘Create Your Own Blockchain in 30 Minutes – (Medium, January 22 2018) 
https://medium.com/@ssaurel/create-your-own-blockchain-in-30-minutes-dbde3293b390.  
54 https://www.ethereum.org/. 
55 A list of platforms can be found here: https://hackernoon.com/contractpedia-an-encyclopedia-of-40-
smart-contract-platforms-4867f66da1e5. 
56 The concept was introduced here: Buterin V, A next-generation smart contract and decentralized 
application platform (2014) https://cryptorating.eu/whitepapers/Ethereum/Ethereum_white_paper.pdf. 
57 More about tokens in Müller L, supra note 52.  
represents fungible goods58 for trade, and these can be “coins, shares, outcomes or 
tickets, or everything else which is transferable and countable”.59  
The function of tokens will be entirely dependant on the needs of the contract, but some 
platforms have specific uses for tokens. In the Ethereum platform, there are tokens that 
can be used to make a payment for each transaction (usage token), and tokens that 
identify participation or ownership in a contract (work tokens).60 We can have ownership 
tokens, identity tokens, and even tokens representing votes for governance purposes.  
There are several problems with this as a workable legal definition. The main issue is that 
while the language attempts to be neutral, it is evident that this refers to a specific type 
of contracts that depend on transactions expressed on a blockchain, and ignores some of 
the most salient features of smart contracts. The main problem is that this definition is 
designed specifically with a contract that is used to transfer assets on a distributed ledger. 
As we will see in the next section, some smart contracts are indeed being used for 
transacting goods, but there are many other uses that do not fall under this definition, 
particularly because of the narrow specification of assets capable of being transacted.  
So the definition presents a conundrum, it is both too narrow and too broad. Because it 
requires smart contracts to be about the transfer of assets, it appears to be only 
preoccupied with a narrow band of contracts that are used to perform these transactions. 
But these transactions have to be recorded in a blockchain, and the definition of a 
blockchain is extremely broad as to allow any sort of cryptographic database to qualify. 
So smart contracts, from a legal perspective, are only those contracts that transfer assets 
stored on any cryptographic ledger.  
2.2 Smart contracts in practice 
The advantages of automated transactions should be self-evident, proven by the 
existence of these types of agents for decades. However, the usefulness of the strong 
version of smart contracts described above may not be as apparent. Some of the interest 
that has arisen from the agreements written into the blockchain is that the proponents 
see it as an important development that will bring efficiency, transparency, and 
decentralisation to electronic contracting.  
A smart contract would have several capabilities that make it theoretically attractive for 
users and businesses: the contracts are immutable, secure, provide tamper-proof 
evidence, allow seamless execution, can allow immediate transfer of funds, do not require 
a central authority, and are open to scrutiny. Another element that is present in smart 
contracts is that they provide a trustless way of conducting transactions; this is because 
the decentralised nature of the contract does away with the need to have trusted 
intermediaries to the conclusion of a transaction.61 Proponents of smart contracts see 
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them as a way to automate large number of legal functions, eventually disrupting the legal 
profession,62 and some even argue that they could bring about the end of government 
altogether.63  
Anything can be automated in this manner, take this example of a potential use:  
“Let's say that we want to organize a small conference. We need 100 
people to sign up and pay/deposit money, so we can rent a hotel and such. 
But if not enough people sign up by a certain date, then the deposits need 
to be refunded. With Ethereum, we can write in a JavaScript-like language 
to code up this contract. It'll guarantee that everyone will get a ticket to 
the conference, or everyone will get their money refunded, depending on 
how many sign up.”64 
Similar potential applications are countless. Because the basic tools for writing a smart 
contract are mostly open source65 and free to use, anyone can learn to code a contract 
into software, and have it written into a blockchain. The performance of the contract is 
automated, and no human intervention is necessary.  
However, when we talk about smart contracts, the “contract” word is not used in the 
strictest legal sense. We will discuss this in more detail later, but in theory anything that 
can be expressed in IF-THEN statements can be turned into a strong smart contract, and 
these documents may or may not fall under the legal definition of a contracts. So for 
example, you can have an executable file to express eternal love in the blockchain,66 
creating a credit association,67 and even blatant ponzi schemes.68 Given the decentralised 
nature of the development environment, anything goes.  
While the flexible nature of smart contracts is one of its most attractive features, there is 
no recognised classification of such contracts for legal and regulatory purposes. We 
propose the following broad classification: 
Machine-to-machine transactions: As described in the commercial mentioned in the 
introduction, one of the biggest potentials for smart contracts is to implement 
transactions between machines in “a web of tiny services that enable the creation and 
autonomous activity of very complex systems.”69 Anything that does not require human 
intervention, such as automated ordering systems, supply-chain distribution and 
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tracking, and the management of IoT devices,70 could be performed through smart 
contracts. While many of these transactions do not require strong smart contracts,71 it 
has been postulated that the addition of open distributed ledgers enhances the potential 
of networked transactions as all records are public, and therefore parties in a supply 
chain do not need to maintain separate databases, but only one.72  
Cryptocurrency: While this function is not exclusive of smart contracts, platforms such 
as Ethereum offer the possibility of users to create and deploy their own cryptocurrency. 
Through the use of a smart contract that contains a token,73 this can be distributed as a 
“coin”, a tradeable and fungible currency.  
Crowdfunding: Related to the use of tokens as coins, a popular development in smart 
contracts has been their use to crowdfund projects and startups, this is done through 
what is known as an initial coin offering (ICO).74 An ICO is usually a token offered to 
members of the public by the entity interested in raising funds, and these pay for the 
token in return for some sort of participation in the project, be it by a licence to use 
software, a claim to an underlying asset, or a promise of participation in future profits.75  
Governance: It is possible to use smart contracts to create an automated governance 
scheme that is run, organised, and enforced through code in what is known as a 
decentralised autonomous organisation (DAO).76 There is no set model for a DAO, but the 
understanding is that all aspects of an organisation are coded into the smart contract, 
from financial transactions, to voting, and governance mechanisms.77 
Decentralised applications: Better known as ÐApps, decentralised applications are 
pieces of software that are stored on the blockchain and run using smart contracts and 
tokens.78 The applications are stored around the world in the computers connected to the 
platform’s nodes. 
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Rights management: An interesting proposal for smart contracts would be in the 
allocation of management of rights, for example, in copyright.79 “Authors can publish 
works on the blockchain and then “use smart contracts to automate the control of who 
has access to their works and under which conditions”80 and to obtain remuneration. 
There are various schemes doing this type of thing, an interesting one is SuperRare, which 
uses a smart contract platform to allow artist to release limited-edition artworks “tracked 
on the blockchain, making the art rare, verified and collectible.”81    
Registries: By using a blockchain as a method to record data in an immutable manner, 
there are proposals to use smart contracts to power registration systems.82 Various 
systems that require registration services have been suggested as test cases for the 
technology, including land registries,83 copyright registries,84 and even the issuing of 
identity tokens.85 These registries are different to other smart contracts because they rely 
on a registration authority, which make them more centralised than most other 
suggested implementation.  
Dispute resolution: Finally, smart contracts could be used to intermediate disputes by 
providing an automated way to solve differences through code.86 Online dispute 
resolution87 already uses automated means to bring parties together, and by adding 
smart contracts written into a distributed ledger that allows immediate execution could 
be a way to mechanize many legal conflicts. The question remains of what happens when 
there is a conflict on the terms that are written into the contract, but that will be dealt 
with in the next section.  
These are just some of the main categories of possible uses for smart contracts. Readers 
may see that many of these proposed uses are in early stage of planning and have not 
been fully deployed. This is a common characteristic of much of the literature dealing 
with blockchains in general, and smart contracts are no exception. While there are 
thousands of examples of smart contracts online, mainstream implementation remains 
minimal at the time of writing. To illustrate the point, A curated list of nearly three 
thousand ÐApps shows just over 75 thousand transactions per day, which is an average 
of 25 transactions per decentralised app. So, while the potential remains great, it is 
justified to question the relative low adoption levels.  
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Generally speaking, smart contracts run on proof of work blockchains, and as it was 
discussed earlier these can be resource-heavy, difficult to setup, slow, and expensive.88 
Another reason could be that smart contracts are still shrouded in legal uncertainty. The 
next section will look at the legal issues.  
3. A critical analysis of smart contracts 
3.1 Smart contracts are not contracts 
The title of this section is purposefully controversial for a reason. It is at this point of the 
conversation that most articles dealing with smart contracts will move to deal with a legal 
aspect of the technology, assuming that smart contracts should be treated using similar 
rules that we use to analyse “dumb” analogue contracts. Therefore, we have legal analysis 
of aspects such as contract formation,89 interpretation,90 and force majeure,91 just to 
name a few. The growing legal literature dealing with the technology has been covering 
almost every aspect of the phenomenon,92 and the main common denominator is to 
conclude that for the most part smart contracts are indeed binding legal agreements. 
While some researchers identify concerns and potential uncertainties with the 
application of existing law to the phenomenon,93 others tend to be more optimistic, and 
herald a future where parties need not bother with monitoring execution and 
performance of the contract, as the machine will take care of everything.94  
However, there is a clear trend towards increasing scepticism of the application of 
traditional contract law to smart contracts. While some commentators have either been 
enthusiastic or neutral,95 we can identify two sceptical positions when it comes to the 
technology. On the one hand, some argue that many of the apparent challenges by the 
technology are already addressed in contract law,96 on the other hand, there are those 
who see smart contracts as not being related to traditional contracts at all.97 
Nonetheless, with increasing question marks over the technology coming from existing 
analysis, it seems evident that the current legislative approach has been to take smart 
contracts at face value. After all, the few laws dealing with distributed cryptographic 
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agreements specifically declare that a contract should not be declared invalid just 
because it is a smart contract.  
There are many reasons why smart contracts are not contracts, and we should start 
treating them as something else. The problem is that the technology, as it currently exists, 
has features that make it incompatible with what we understand as a contract, to the 
extent that it may be impractical to even consider them in this light. This is not to mean 
that they cannot be contracts, ostensibly there are already non-cryptographic smart 
contracts in existence, 98  but that for all intents and purposes they should not be.  
The first challenge is that, as a matter of fact, many so-called smart contracts are anything 
but, and the intention of the drafting parties is not to enter into a contract. While we have 
set out a few commonalities to what is considered a smart contract, the distributed nature 
of the developing environment means that there is little or no standardisation, and 
therefore there may be a very large number of self-executing code written in a blockchain 
that may not be intended to have a binding nature in the legal sense.  
Given the technical definition that is at the centre of this article, namely that a smart 
contract is a set of instructions written in a programming language into a blockchain, then 
some of these instructions could fit under the definition of a contract if the intention fulfils 
contractual formation formalities, but some may not. There are various uses for the 
technology that are clearly not intended as such, and their functionality is to provide a 
non-contractual service. For example, some existing code fulfils mere functions, such as 
time-stamping, notarising documents, creating a token, and creating a random number 
generator, just to name a few.99 On the other hand, some code is clearly designed to act 
as a contract by describing something akin to legal obligations, such as using code to 
express a software licence,100 or an agreement to charge fees.101 The intention of the 
parties, and the way the code is written, will be the key of whether the code should be 
read as a legal contract. One could argue that all strong smart contracts are contracts in 
the legal sense as they set out enforceable obligations in code,102 but this would lead to 
giving validity to electronic documents that are not intended to have that effect, so we 
will assume that each contract has to be analysed on a case by case basis. 
Even if the contract is intended by the parties to be akin to a traditional paper contract, 
there is a problem with the assumption that all types of agreements can be conducted in 
a cryptographically secure manner. This is perhaps the most salient problem with 
agreements that that are connected to tangible goods or represent real services. Strong 
smart contracts operate better in a fully digital environment, where cryptocurrency 
funds can be immediately released as payment in exchange for digital goods or services, 
made possible through the tokenisation of items. But this becomes extremely difficult 
when real goods and services are involved, because the self-executing characteristic of 
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smart contracts, which is one of its most important selling points, can only work if there 
is a direct link between the physical goods and the digital code.  
Take one of the advertised uses for smart contracts, their use in transfer of property. In 
principle, the use of a smart contract for such an operation seems appealing, as it would 
provide an immutable record of the transaction, but the problem is precisely that the 
contract does not know whether there has been an actual transfer of property, it just 
operates with the data that has been entered into the blockchain, the person making the 
input could lie. So, we are back to trusting an intermediary, which sort of defeats the 
purpose. Developer Jimmy Song describes this problem: 
“There is an intractable problem in linking a digital to a physical asset 
whether it be fruit, cars or houses at least in a decentralized context. 
Physical assets are regulated by the jurisdiction you happen to be in and 
this means they are in a sense trusting something in addition to the smart 
contract you’ve created. This means that possession in a smart contract 
doesn’t necessarily mean possession in the real world and suffers from the 
same trust problem as normal contracts. A smart contract that trusts a 
third party removes the killer feature of trustlessness.”103  
So until we can find ways of accurately describing reality in digital form in a manner that 
can be read by a smart contract (the so-called Oracle Problem),104 then most smart 
contracts will be mostly useful only for digital goods.  
Another reason not to look at smart contracts from a legal perspective is that they are 
purposefully designed to disrupt the legal profession, at least in accordance to many 
proponents, and the intention is to have systems that will not necessitate any legal 
analysis, and any sort of recourse or oversight will be a thing of the past.105 There is a 
considerable libertarian streak to some of the cryptocurrency circles, and the blockchain 
is often offered as a technology that will change governance as we know it, and it may 
even lead to the destruction of the state altogether.106 In the words of Nick Szabo:  
“Trust-minimized rules are new & in many ways will be vastly superior to 
what trusted but often not so trustworthy kings, judges, legislatures or 
regulators have concocted. Trust-minimized code will bring reality to the 
constitutional ideal "a government of laws & not of men."107 
Smart contracts become a new jurisdiction, a technical realm where enforcement 
becomes a question of the past, and where being in control of a good smart contract will 
be “99% of the law".108 This will bring about a lawyerless utopia of code where users 
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program obligations into computer programs without the intention of ever seeing a court 
of law.  
But the main challenges are brought by the blockchain itself, the very same feature that 
makes strong smart contracts supposedly so appealing. These characteristics are the 
distributed and immutable nature of this technological solution. These issues are not 
present in non-cryptographic automated contracts, the distributed ledger technology 
carries an entirely different dimension to the potential pitfalls encountered by these 
types of documents. We will now look at the problems presented by these two features.  
3.2 The problem with immutability 
The main concern is that distributed ledger technology, as understood generally by the 
Nakamoto definition, contains a requirement of immutability, the blockchain cannot be 
changed, it is tamper-free, and whatever is written into it cannot be changed or censored. 
This means that whatever smart contract is written into this ledger will also be 
immutable, making it difficult (if not impossible) to change the code.  
To better understand this, one must understand how the blockchain is immutable from a 
technical perspective. Smart contracts are considered immutable because of something 
called a hash. Roughly speaking, a hash function is a mathematical operation that can 
produce a unique output depending on the input; you can take some text, turn it into 
numbers, and then apply a formula (the hash function) that will produce a unique number 
(the hash value). If you changed the original text, then the resulting number would not 
match the hash value.109 Blockchains consist of blocks of transactions that are chained 
together by appending the hash of the previous transaction to the next, making it 
impossible to change, and therefore tamper-free. 
While this feature is extremely useful when it comes to verifiability of data, it has the 
problem that once written, it cannot be changed, hence the immutable element. It must 
be said that there are circumstances in which there can be changes, but we will deal with 
those later, for now we can assume that for all intents and purposes the blockchain is 
immutable. If everything works well, then this feature makes it easy to trust the 
information entered into the blockchain. But the opposite is true, if you enter wrong data 
or information into the ledger, then it cannot be amended. This means that smart 
contracts are practically set in stone, as the technical robustness fails to take into account 
the complexity of real contracts, where the social element is often as important, if not 
more, than the formal elements written into the document.110  
The problems that arise from perpetuating errors in code are not just abstract 
possibilities, this has already happened several times. The most famous case is that of the 
Ethereum Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO). As the name indicates, the 
objective of this application is to use smart contracts to help in the operation of 
decentralized organizational governance, in their words, it “leverages smart contracts on 
the Ethereum blockchain so that anyone, anywhere in the world can be empowered to 
participate.”111 The DAO operates as a facilitator for smart contracts, and also as a 
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governance structure for shared resources. Imagine that you have a startup that wants to 
hire help quickly and efficiently in order to scale operations. Currently, you have to 
negotiate with each contractor individually, and this takes time and money. With the DAO, 
you would pay ether (ETH) into the DAO, and at the same time you set terms and 
conditions of what you want the contractors to do, while the ETH is held securely. The 
contractors participating in the DAO define the parameters of their contract in code 
(business model, payment, operational parameters), if the contractor code meets the 
DAO code, then there is an autonomous smart contract formed, upon completion of which 
the DAO releases payment. Those who support the DAO receive voting rights in the shape 
of DAO tokens, as well as possible dividends in the shape of ether. The DAO is ruled by 
the voting performed by those participating in the system, making it a completely 
decentralized governance model.  
The problem started in June 2016 with a small bug in the DAO code. The DAO operates as 
a public pool of funds holding several millions of dollars’ worth in Ether, and only those 
participating in the scheme, or those completing contracts, can withdraw funds according 
to the pre-established terms of their participation. Using the pool analogy, you can 
imagine several hoses being fed by the pool, each with a tap that opens and closes using 
pre-defined conditions. But there was a bug in the code that allowed malicious 
participants to call recursive functions upon the closing of a transaction that allowed the 
tap to remain open, and in theory it would let them drain the entire pool. This is precisely 
what happened, and hackers exploited the bug and were able to drain 3.6 million ETH 
from the DAO common fund.112 It is indicative of the technical nature of smart contracts 
that this error was not solved by legal means, the developers and maintainers decided to 
“fork” the code, which resulted in an entirely new version of the DAO without the bug, 
and therefore where the “theft” had never taken place, a technical way to turn back 
time.113 Forking in the software sense means a split in development, it is to take a 
project’s source code and begin a separate development altogether, creating a fork in the 
code. While the original code remains, all future instances of the software will use the 
new code.114 
It may be easy to underestimate the importance of this fork. The practical result was that 
there were two Ethereum implementations in existence, one with the DAO funds stolen, 
and one where the bug was fixed, and therefore the syphoning never took place. The 
original code was renamed “Ethereum Classic”,115 and the forked version became plain 
Ethereum. This is probably the single most important decision made by any smart 
contract developer, and it is one that continues to have serious repercussions for the 
claim that smart contracts and blockchains are immutable. While this is technically true, 
evidenced by the fact that the original Ethereum still exists and cannot be easily changed, 
we are presented with an example where developers intervene to change the code. 
Immutability is therefore dependent entirely on the will of the platform developers, and 
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everything that is written into a blockchain, including smart contracts, are entirely 
dependent on the decisions made by those in control of the code. Smart contract 
therefore become a matter of governance, and not of contract law.      
To reinforce this, there have been other high-profile errors in which developers did not 
intervene, displaying once more the power that the platforms have. On November 2017, 
a bug in a multi-signature smart contract for an Ethereum-based wallet resulted in the 
freezing of $280 million USD in ether at the time. As the code is immutable and written in 
the blockchain, there was no other way of unlocking the funds other to change the 
blockchain and re-write history.116 In stark contrast with the DAO theft, where the 
community decided to fork the code to fix the bug that allowed funds to be taken out, in 
the case of the Parity wallet there has not been a similar technical solution, and at the 
time of writing the funds remain frozen and no legal action has been forthcoming. In fact, 
the Parity wallet team have released a statement apologizing to the community for the 
bug and claiming that they are still committed to developing in the Ethereum 
environment.117 It is a testament of the reliance of the community on developers that 
there has not been any legal action taken so far, even though this error involved 
considerable amounts of money. The community seems intent on carrying on despite the 
problems. The immutable code prevailed, and future implementations of the Parity 
Wallet code had to be re-written without the bug, but the existing error was not or forked, 
and therefore still remains.  
Bugs and backdoors118 in contracts are exceedingly common, with one report placing the 
figure at about 25% of all smart contracts having some sort of error,119 while another 
study analysed 19,366 Ethereum-based smart contracts, and found that 44% of them 
contained some sort of bug.120 As a lot of code is shared between contracts, the same error 
can often be replicated to multiple documents, for example, a bug on transaction orders 
was found in 15% of all Ethereum contracts.121 As David Gerard said: “there are endless 
guides to writing a secure smart contract for Ethereum, but most Ethereum contracts 
ignore them, with the obvious consequences.”122  
And these figures are only about unintentional bugs, it is possible for coders to 
purposefully build a contract with flaws so that all funds are removed from a wallet,123 or 
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to create a contract that operates intentionally as a pyramid scheme, with a bug that 
allows funds to be taken outside of the original parameters.124  
Having so many errors and mistakes in immutable code has been one of the most salient 
and discussed aspects of smart contracts. This is where it is tempting to talk about the 
will of the parties, error, mistake, frustration, and the enforcement of contractual 
obligations set out in code.125 Experience with non-cryptographic automated contracts in 
the past lead us to believe that the contract law is in general quite well prepared to handle 
many of the issues that could arise from the performance and enforcement of a contract 
that contains an error, and that there may not be liability arising from an honest mistake 
that makes it impossible for the parties to perform the contract as originally drafted.126 
There is extensive case law dealing with such cases in various jurisdictions127 and one 
could think that there is no reason why such rules would not apply to strong smart 
contracts either.  
But the immutable element makes such strict legal considerations almost moot. When 
presented with a situation such as the Parity Wallet, we are witnessing some bugs that 
could frustrate the performance of a contract, and this may arise from an honest technical 
error, but there is nothing that could remedy such a situation from a legal perspective. 
There may not be a party to sue, and even if a court examined the circumstances and 
agreed that there had been an obvious error, the court may be powerless to make any 
changes, or to redress the situation. Immutable self-executing code cannot be taken to 
court.  
We could then be in the presence of an alternative legal space where “parties can transact 
outside of the legal system”.128 While a party may want to obtain redress, it would be 
technically impossible to do so. The contract itself is code written in a distributed ledger, 
with a set of instructions that are meant to be executed by a machine without human 
intervention. If such an interaction cannot be modified by external factors, then 
enforcement would not be a viable solution, and may not even be possible.  
While smart contracts could make a number of transactions cheaper and more efficient, 
parties will have to consider that redress in the face of bugs and errors could render the 
contract inoperable. In a recent speech on the subject of financial technology, Lord Hodge 
of the UK Supreme Court made the following comments accepting the challenges of these 
new technical realities: 
“But the law has to address how to provide a remedy if contractual consent 
has been vitiated, for example, by misrepresentation or fraud. Smart 
contracts are self-executing as the terms of the agreement between a 
buyer and a seller are written into lines of code which exist in a blockchain. 
When the coded conditions are met, a product is released or a payment 
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made. No-one, including a court, can stop the performance of a smart 
contract. The courts will not be able to cancel the performance of the 
contract. But a remedy may lie in the law of unjust enrichment in both 
common law and civil law jurisdictions to compel the parties to re-transfer 
the property or money which was the subject of the transaction.”129 
It is interesting that the legal establishment already recognises that self-executing 
contracts may fall outside of the legal judicial powers to enforce, and Lord Hodge may be 
unto something with the proposed solution of looking at redress directly to the parties 
through unjust enrichment, and not through contract law as such. But there is one more 
feature of smart contracts that could even frustrate such a strategy, and it is the potential 
of anonymity, particularly with some contracts that could be part of a larger pool of 
resources, such as the DAO. The party benefiting from the mistake could not be easily 
identifiable, and then we would be back to having an unenforceable document that 
cannot be the subject of legal action.  
It must be said that the above is a feature, not a bug. As we have seen, some of the most 
vocal proponents for strong smart contracts envisage an arrangement that sits outside of 
the traditional legal system of courts and lawyers. The immutable nature of distributed 
ledgers is precisely designed to frustrate legal intervention. The existence of smart 
contracts as a techno-anarchy without laws and judges, only code, may not sit well with 
many, and in fact it could even dissuade some parties from attempting to adopt the 
technology. Given the likelihood that something will go wrong due to an error, the 
absence of legal enforcement would become a risk-factor to take into account when 
looking at the viability of contracts written into immutable public ledgers. 
3.3. The problems of decentralisation 
This brings us the second relevant characteristic of smart contracts, and that is the fact 
that they are distributed. What this means is that in a public and trustless blockchain, a 
smart contract is not run exclusively by the parties in a contract, but would be executed 
by the network of nodes that maintains the blockchain. In other words, the contract 
would be executed by “the network of miners who reach consensus on the outcome of 
the execution and update the blockchain accordingly.”130 While this may seem like a 
technical detail on the surface, sort of in the same way that the Internet itself is a “network 
of networks”, this aspect can be one of the most relevant features of this type of smart 
contracts from a formal perspective, as the contract does not exist if there is no network 
to verify the transactions.  
Most smart contracts nowadays rely on platforms such as Ethereum. While it is possible 
to have a private blockchain, the main appeal of decentralised databases using proof of 
work is the use of an open source, distributed ledger that is maintained by thousands of 
nodes, and where transactions are verified by miners. The miners are the most important 
part of this scheme, as they perform the mathematical calculations required for the 
contract to be performed. The incentive of these actors to perform such verifications is 
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that they are rewarded with a block after some time and resources have been spent, these 
miners are what make possible to run contracts in a distributed manner. In some sense, 
these miners are the ones that are executing and performing the contract. A smart 
contract platform consists of these miners, as well as the developer that released the code 
they are using to mine.131  
This is one of the characteristics of blockchains that is touted as giving it reliance and 
security,132 the network is distributed and therefore all participants verify the 
transactions through the mining for coins, and the permanent record of the transaction 
is shared publicly for all to see. In smart contracts, the ledger is both a record and 
verification, sort of like having thousands of notaries verifying a signature.  
For the most part the system works as intended. Parties write a contract in code and 
publish it in a blockchain which is maintained by developers and miners. There is an 
ecosystem that does not rely on trust, all the parties are self-interested in maintaining the 
status quo, miners execute the calculations needed to verify the transactions because 
they get rewarded. Some systems may also offer transaction fees. The contracting parties 
can rely on those involved doing their job.  
But the fault in the system is the very reliance on these third parties, the permanent 
record cannot exist without the blockchain, and the blockchain cannot exist without the 
infrastructure of developers and miners, and these could become very important to the 
whole endeavour.  As with a paper contract, there are usually at least two parties directly 
involved in a cryptographic smart contract, and under normal circumstances these would 
be the only parties to any conflict should one arise. But in automated contracts on a 
distributed ledger, there could be many other indirect participants, as blockchains are 
composed of a multiplicity of actors that have a relevant participation on its operation; 
this includes participants, developers, administrators, and gateways.133  
So smart contracts are not only dependent on the two or more parties that have entered 
into an agreement, they also involve the software developer that produces the program, 
and it also involves thousands of miners around the world that perform the verifications 
required for the contract to run. The idea behind distributed applications and contracts 
is that all of these participants do not care about any one specific transaction, they run 
thousands of contracts at the same time. Miners operate independently, so they all get to 
verify the “history” as written in the blockchain together. These are not participant in any 
specific transaction, they just make the system work for everyone.  
However, this works as long as the integrity of the blockchain remains intact. Proof of 
work is built in a way that makes it very difficult to change, but it is not completely 
impossible, the system relies on a majority of miners operating rationally to protect the 
integrity of the ledger. But what happens if a single entity managed to get enough 
computing power to re-write the blockchain? Then we get what is called a “51% 
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attack”,134 one mining entity (or a multitude working in unison) gain control of more than 
half of the computing power dedicated to make calculations required to maintain the 
blockchain, they can re-write the blockchain, could change transactions, or even re-write 
contract code.  This would mean that in theory, contracts could be changed at will with a 
sufficient level of technical resources spent to change the ledger.  
This opens up several new of legal issues, most of which have gone unexplored for now. 
It is technically possible for miners to get together at some point and perform an attack 
on a specific contract. This is not fully hypothetical, it became a possibility in the past 
when a popular smart contract called FOMO32 started accumulating large amounts of 
money, and several developers discussed that it could be profitable for miners to get 
together and empty the contract’s funds.135 However, proof of work systems do not make 
it easy for such an attack to take place, for starters, the resources needed to mount a 
successful majority attack may be prohibitive. But while miners are competing with 
others for rewards, most cryptocurrencies are nowadays so difficult to mine that there is 
an incentive for collaboration in what is known as a mining pool, a collection of miners 
working together to maximise profits.136 While the mining pools can consist of 
individuals, the cost of mining has meant that some sort of centralisation has been taking 
place, particularly involving Chinese entities, and nowadays most of the cryptocurrency 
mining is taking place in China.137 Such centralisation makes it more likely that some sort 
of majority attack could take place on an entire infrastructure.  
It is possible to calculate the amount of computing power needed to undertake an attack, 
and there are lists that cite the needed to successfully re-write the blockchain for specific 
coins.138 At the time of writing, the cost in computing power of taking over the Bitcoin 
network for an hour is $263,416 USD, and while expensive, it is by no means excessively 
onerous for a dedicated party. For comparison, attacking the Ethereum network would 
cost $66,763 USD, and some coins such as Litecoin Cash can be taken over with just $59 
USD worth of computing power. One can make the argument is that one should pick only 
mature and popular cryptocurrencies to write a smart contract, future success is not 
assured, so one could write a smart contract using a blockchain that is supported by a 
popular network, only to see that support collapsing in the future. After all, mining is only 
sustainable if the miners are ensured to stay profitable, and sudden drops in prices139 
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could be translated into a fall in participating miners in the network, which also makes a 
majority attack more likely.  
These concerns stopped being an eventuality in November 2018, when cryptocurrency 
Vertcoin was subjected to a successful 51% attack, with over 300 blocks being changed 
from the blockchain, resulting in changes that exceeded $100,000 USD in value.140 This 
specific attack is worrying because it was sustained, and it also involved multiple blocks, 
this means that attackers were able to wrestle control of the system for a sustained period 
of time, and also means that not only one block was attacked, but several.  
But the most worrying development took place in early January 2019 when the 
aforementioned Ethereum Classic was subject to a massive 51% attack.141 After the DAO 
fork, most of the Ethereum community migrated to the new version, but the original code 
and blockchain still remained usable, and the coin was still being traded in exchanges. 
However, when most people migrated, so did the miners, so the coin remained a prime 
target to a concerted attack, which successfully took place. The attackers conducted what 
is known as a “double-spend” attack, which is in fact a reversal of a transaction in which 
coins spent are given back to the assailant. This is normally not possible because the 
transactions cannot be changed, but if one has gained control of the network, it is possible 
to transmit a version of history in which the money is still in my wallet. It is calculated 
that in this occasion the perpetrators managed to conduct 15 double-spend transactions 
worth over $1 million USD.142 
There is evidence of other successful attacks against other smaller coins.143 The problem 
is that once a platform becomes disused, or the price of the cryptocurrency used to 
support transactions decreases, then there is no incentive for miners to put resources 
into maintaining the integrity of the system. Contracts written into such a ledger would 
be liable to be changed. The result is that the much-vaunted immutability of smart 
contracts can only be assured as long as it is not worthwhile for a dedicated party to 
mount an attack. In the case of contracts involving large sums of money, this could be 
both viable and profitable for the attackers.  
As stated above, there is growing concern that mining has become increasingly 
centralised, with large mining pools operating in coordinated fashion.144 Moreover, a 
study of mining practices in some cryptocurrencies has found that some networks and 
developers have a more direct hand in mining practices, when it was discovered that 
popular currency Monero had been secretly mining its own coins in a coordinated 
manner, and they were spending about 50% of all of the computing power in the network 
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at that time.145 Obviously, this would mean that a smart contract written in these types of 
blockchains and using those coins as tokens could be vulnerable, and not immutable at 
all.  
But miners are not the only parties involved, platforms rely on shared code, and a set of 
developers that allow the system to exist. To understand the relevance of the developers 
to smart contracts, we need to understand the governance structure of the code that 
sustains the contracts.  
Take Ethereum, still the most popular smart contract platform. The Ethereum ecosystem 
consists of a number of developer tools, which include a programming language, an open 
source operating system to run ÐApps, the cryptocurrency Ether, and a blockchain. The 
platform was proposed in 2013 by developer Vitalik Buterin, and it came into existence 
in 2015 after using an ICO to crowdfund its development. The organisation as such 
started life as a company, and it is now a non-profit Foundation based in Switzerland. The 
Foundation’s role is to “is to promote and support Ethereum platform”,146 and as such it 
has little or no technical role. Currently, the technical decision-making structure is based 
on the Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP-1), which is a governance system that 
makes decisions on standards and technical implementation, and it tries to gain 
consensus from the developer community.  
The practical effect of this structure is that it is the community that makes decisions that 
are relevant to the platform used to run smart contracts. This is vital, because it is the 
resilience of the technology what makes many of the claims of the security and 
immutability of smart contracts possible. If changing the code that supported an 
agreement was easy, then contracting parties would be subject to the whims of a 
nameless and faceless developing community of coders.  
This is precisely what happened with the DAO hack and its subsequent fork, a decision 
that could have wide-ranging consequences of how we think about smart contract 
platforms from a legal perspective. When the bug and subsequent Ether theft was 
uncovered, most developers seemed to agree that the best solution was to fork the 
platform code and retroactively re-write the blockchain to a stage where the vulnerability 
would not be possible. Buterin did not have the power to do this on his own, and needed 
the rough consensus of other developers to do it, but he advocated strongly for a fork to 
fix to the issue so that developers would be able to trust the system again.147 But fixing a 
bug in this way, and re-writing the blockchain, is a highly controversial decision, one that 
was opposed by some other participants. For example, a developer wrote:  
“One solution is to roll-back the blockchain before the theft. Of course, that 
means screwing over everybody who made a transaction since then. You’d 
be screwing people out of $1 million in order to compensate the theft of 
$100 million. This is, of course, the type of corrupt thinking that gets us 
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into banking failures in the real world, as we screw over everyone else in 
order to protect those banks who are too big to fail.”148 
As it is evident from the above, and many other writings at the time,149 the Ethereum 
development environment is filled with libertarians and crypto-anarchists that see such 
centralized decision-making as anathema to the very ethos of the blockchain. But more 
importantly, by getting together and making a decision to change the blockchain, the 
Ethereum developers opened the door for future legal recourse against platforms such as 
the Ethereum Foundation. If there is a bug in your code you can try to ask the developers 
to have it changed, as has been the case several times when smart contract bugs have 
been uncovered.150 We need not think about smart contracts using the terms of contract 
law, but should rather think of them as a service where the legal remedies sought would 
be not against the party, but against the developers asking for a court-mandated fork to 
fix the blockchain.  
While this notion started as a joke151 in some developer circles, it has started to gain 
traction. Earlier this year, a class action suit was filed in New York152 against the 
developers of the cryptocurrency NANO (XRB), where the plaintiffs requested a fork to 
recover $170 million USD that had been stolen due to a hack to a cryptocurrency 
exchange in February 2018. In the complaint,153 the plaintiffs argued that the developers 
of NANO had the ability to return the stolen funds by forking its blockchain in a manner 
that would re-allocate the stolen tokens to their original and lawful owners. The case was 
dismissed because the plaintiff abandoned it, so we never got to read a decision on the 
legal merits of asking for a court-mandated change to the blockchain. While the case does 
not involve smart contracts directly, it could give an indication of where parties involved 
in large contracts could try to tackle the potential unenforceable nature of smart 
contracts.  
But even here most legal action could be futile. The developers working in 
cryptocurrency and smart contract development are often operating outside of a 
centralised structure using open source licensing and repositories. While there may be a 
central organisation such as the Ethereum Foundation, these tend to rely on an army of 
independent developers who contribute to the code. Even if we were to imagine a court 
issuing a mandated fork, or some change to try to fix an error in a smart contract, the 
developers could ignore it. Enforcement of such an order would be difficult, if not 
impossible.  
The above has led some researchers to argue that software developers could be 
considerably more liable than it has been previously assumed. Walch claims that in the 
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context of cryptocurrencies, coders operate more like fiduciaries than anything else, and 
as such the trust that is given to them should open the organisation to being legally 
accountable as fiduciaries if they “fail to act with competence on behalf of those who rely 
on the blockchain”.154    
While the proposal of treating developers as fiduciaries is interesting, what is more likely 
to happen is that plaintiffs and courts will use a range of legal options that could be 
deployed against platforms.  
Once we recognise that there are intermediaries that could be capable of making changes 
to a blockchain to change the terms of a smart contract, then anything that could be used 
to compel those intermediaries can and will be used. It could be a question of the law of 
equity, trusts, negligence, unjust enrichment, and maybe even intellectual property. What 
matters is that a party that feels they are bound by an erroneous and/or fraudulent smart 
contract, they will not seek redress against the other party, but rather will try to compel 
the platforms as active intermediaries. Already regulators are looking155 at 
intermediaries as the true actors in this space, so perhaps this will offer us an indication 
of where most enforcement will take place. However, the decentralised nature of the 
development environment would probably continue to frustrate users.  
This could not only stop with the software developers, but could be extended to those 
with real control, namely the miners. A future where a court orders a mining pool to make 
changes to a contract would also be a possibility, particularly in situations where it has 
been demonstrated that the developers have exercised majority control over the mining 
resources, such as those discussed earlier.  
Interestingly, we could be entering an era in which the limitation of liability of 
intermediaries that was experienced during the early years of the Internet156 could be 
tested again in court, but this time the defending intermediaries would be software 
developers, cryptocurrency miners, and blockchain platform maintainers. 
The general idea is that the intermediaries are not liable because they just facilitate the 
infrastructure that can be used to run the system, much like telecommunications 
companies are not liable for fraud that is committed using a telephone, this is responding 
to what is called Szabo’s Law,157  which postulates that developers should not “implement 
changes to the blockchain protocol unless the changes are required for the purpose of 
technical maintenance.” This is because making any proactive decisions could open 
platforms to legal liability. For the most part, this theory has held, even with a few 
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regulators claiming that they view platforms as mere conduits.158 In theory developers 
are not involved in the contracts themselves, and the system runs like the self-executing 
code as intended. However, the more we learn about the practicalities of the 
implementation, the more it becomes evident that the system relies entirely on these 
intermediaries.159   
Both developer-led forks, and 51% attacks give us enough ammunition to think that the 
law governing smart contracts is not contract law, but rather anything that covers 
liability by intermediaries.  
Therefore, smart contracts are not contracts, but they are to be treated just as any other 
piece of software, there may be some contract law involved in the shape of licences and 
such, but they should be seen as a service, with all of the legal implications that it entails.  
4. Conclusion: Code is not law 
In his seminal (and often misunderstood) work Code: The Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence 
Lessig wrote:  
“[Code] will present the greatest threat to both liberal and libertarian 
ideals, as well as their greatest promise. We can build, or architect, or code 
cyberspace to protect values that we believe are fundamental. Or we can 
build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those values to disappear. 
There is no middle ground. There is no choice that does not include some 
kind of building. Code is never found; it is only ever made, and only ever 
made by us.”160 
Lessig was talking specifically about the difficulties of regulating cyberspace, and he 
argued that the “invisible hand of cyberspace” was shaping a new regulatory solution in 
the architecture of the Internet that could be used to regulate the space. This is where the 
famous maxim of “Code is Law” comes from.  
Interestingly, this has recently been taken over as the rallying cry of smart contract 
enthusiasts, completely subverting the true regulatory meaning of the phrase, and it has 
morphed into a techno-libertarian article of faith. They tend to consider the words to 
mean that code can be used to replace law, and the smart contract will be the foundational 
tool of a revolution that will end in the replacement of traditional contracts and private 
law with a “digital private law” enforced by code,161 and even going as far as changing the 
famous “pathetic dot” chart to change the dot with a smart contract in the middle.162 
While some see smart contracts as the end of lawyers, the practical implementation of 
smart contracts proves that perhaps such statements are still premature. If anything, the 
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lack of mainstream implementation of smart contracts could act as a sobering reminder 
that we have a legal system for a reason, and that perhaps placing all our trust in faceless 
machines that conduct transactions without possibility of legal redress may still be a 
bridge too far for most developers. Smart contracts remind us that laws are still useful. 
This is why smart contracts may not be legally a contract, but they could still end up 
having considerable legal effects in other areas of law, such as criminal law, data 
protection, intermediary liability, etc.  
While there is certainly scope for the use and implementation of strong smart contracts, 
there are still enough questions about the power of platforms and other intermediaries 
to change the blockchain.  
And this is precisely where there is a serious issue with the way in which contracts are 
being discussed at the moment. The prevalent idea is to take smart contracts as 
cryptographic versions of “real” traditional contracts, and to conduct all of the analysis in 
that way. The argument presented here is that we cannot think of smart contracts as 
perfect self-executing code expressed in an immutable distributed ledger. It is more 
useful to think of them as computer programs running on the cloud. There is no need for 
a new legal analysis, just look precisely at the infrastructure that supports the platforms 
for legal recourse in case something goes wrong.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
